4d shapes
9d colors
4d shapes
9d colors
Diagonal section of ðe 4d cartesian product of 2 "I want to be a sea urchin and eat cabbage"(yes, really) tilings
kinda like ðis
Unfortunately we are still too dimensionally, perceptually, & probably intellectually challenged to even try to look at ðe full θing
#4d cartesian product of 2 of ðese fancy pentagonal tilings + 2d
sections =
Hoy es #28F, el día en las andaluzas y los andaluces conmemoramos el referéndum con el que accedimos a la autonomía. Pero para muchas personas, entre las que me incluyo, el verdadero Día Nacional de Andalucía es el 4 de Diciembre.
En aquella fecha de 1977 dos millones de personas salieron a las calles de las ocho capitales de Andalucía para reclamar nuestros derechos como pueblo. Sin #4D ni hay 28F ni se entiende el actual modelo autonómico español.
En cualquier caso ¡Viva Andalucía Libre!
#Funfact you can tile 4d space with ðe cartesian product of any 2 2d tilings(12.6.4 x 12.6.4 here),
Each resulting duoprism shape has a unique color(even if ðey can look like 2 difrnt polygons in ðese 2dsections)
(26/N)
3. Actively maintain your devices
1] Package managers are no longer the only source of software for systems. Look into a one-stop upgrading tool like Topgrade that takes care of this, and also handles, e.g., updates of #Flatpak applications.
2] Use unattended / automatic upgrades on #Linux distributions that have a non-rolling release model. Restrict them to security upgrades, only: You want your devices to stay secure, but reduce the risk of things breaking while you are not available for resolving any issues. @fedora has listed the pros and cons of unattended upgrades.
You can find helpful howtos on the web for many distros:
Debian, Fedora, Linux Mint, openSUSE, Ubuntu, …
If you can’t find one, as a last resort, look up the parent distribution of yours and continue your search there.
3] Finally, collect notes how you resolved maintenance issues. Include research results, like helpful links. Copy & paste the history of terminal commands used in the process. Integrate these into your regular note-taking system. Don’t lose the knowledge you have acquired.
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(25/N)
2. Bootstrap your workplace
Remove all software packages that you haven't used, ever or since a long time. Whenever you (re)install #Linux on a device, pick the most minimal version of the installer (usually the smallest download for your processor architecture, sometimes still a CD .iso image).
(Re)add only what you need, and when you need it: Wait for it, don't speculate. Our #WFH / #office-centric list of recommended software:
https://tuxwise.net/recommended-software/
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(24/N) There are some best practices that will make it easier to answer threat modeling question #3, "What are you going to do about it?". These will help you protect a wide range of assets by taking care of your devices, so let's look at them first:
1. Encrypt data at rest
What can you achieve with intermediate knowledge, without fully descending into the rat hole?
Caveat: this is best done when setting up #Linux on a new device. Modifying an existing installation on your own IMHO isn't advisable if you're not a seasoned user. If you still decide to venture into it, make SURE you have backed up all your assets, before following "howtos on the internet". You have been warned.
Likening your device to a medieval city:
1) Full-Disk Encryption (FDE) is like locking the "city gate". Most popular Linux distributions offer FDE during the installation process. FDE is also your last line of defense when your device gets stolen, or your disk fails and cannot be safely wiped before disposing of it. Use FDE. (Yes, technically, "Full" is not absolutely accurate. We'll leave it at that.)
2) Within your "city", there will likely be at least two "houses": the home of the admin account, and your personal home. Using FDE alone, the "doors" of these homes won't have any locks of their own. Possibly not a big deal with respect to the administrative account, but admins being able to access any of your non-public assets, even when you're not logged in, is probably not what you want.
While the specific steps depend on your preferred Linux distro, a "portable" solution is to create a separate, encrypted disk partition, and have it mounted as your user home directory, when you log in. That solution is based on cryptsetup and the pam_mount module, nice tutorial examples that resemble each other are, e.g.:
3) Within your "house", you may wish to have a locked "chest", e.g. for your #FYEO assets. There's essentially two options: a) a single, encrypted container file that acts as a "#vault" for your asset files; or b) an encrypted overlay file system that maintains an openly visible directory hosting your encrypted assets, including directory structures, in the background; and allows you to mount a decrypted counterpart, for working on your assets.
a) A "vault", being a single file, is easy to copy and carry around, on arbitrary storage media, e.g. USB sticks. It doesn't reveal too much about its contents, but resizing it takes a little effort. Also, you can't "incrementally backup" content changes, just copy the whole, changed vault.
A nice tutorial for creating and using a vault using plain, standard cryptsetup is https://opensource.com/article/21/4/linux-encryption by @seth . If you must have a GUI for creating and mounting vaults, look at zuluCrypt https://mhogomchungu.github.io/zuluCrypt/ – IMHO the app is still in need of a little polish, though.
b) An encrypted overlay file system allows for incrementally backing up changed assets, but exposes considerable metadata (rough file sizes, directory structures, modification dates).
The most widely used package for this is probably gocryptfs. Its "HowTo" is literally a one-pager: https://nuetzlich.net/gocryptfs/quickstart/
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(23/N) Our fifth, and last, asset classification option:
Public
Assets accessible to, or controlled by, anybody who is aware of them. The existence of such assets is usually easily detectable, or even widely known. Note: "public" refers to potential access or control by the general public, regardless whether there is a legal basis for it.
Public makes a bad default class. Pick Intimate instead.
Start classifying assets
If you haven't done so yet, add a "Classification" column to your asset spreadsheet, and assign each asset to a specific class.
Pick "Intimate" as the default class. Assume that you will act according to the respective classifications, starting today, instead of pondering whether it's "too late", for certain assets.
Some classification suggestions that may look appropriate to you (or not):
For Your Eyes Only (FYEO): Diaries and journals? Private notes?
Intimate: Family photographs? Bank accounts? ToDo lists?
None Of Your Business (NOYB): Your smartphones, tablets, desktops? Medical records? Financial assets? Documents related to legal proceedings?
Shared: Some Personally Identifiable Information #PII (birthdays; place of residence; diploma)? Insurance-related data (lists of valuables; car make and model; flat size)? Travel bookings? Streaming package subscriptions?
Public: Social media or forum posts? Published articles, zines, or books?
When you're finished, consider splitting the spreadsheet in two, and handling the part containing FYEO assets like a FYEO asset, in itself.
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
#genuary I tried making 4d worley noise in 42 lines
ðis is using ðe distances to ðe closest 3 points & ends up being weirdly sparse in some places because of ðe long diagonals in ðe base hypercubic grid
(22/N) Our fourth asset classification option:
Shared
Assets that are accessible to, or controlled by others for a specific purpose, usually under a specific agreement that may also be implicit. Preferably, these assets are kept publicly undetectable and unknown.
Typically, access is granted to persons or entities that are only selectively or partially trusted: coworkers, support groups, suppliers, providers, insurances, payment providers, or communities you belong to.
It is common to minimize sharing of critical assets by having multiple, restricted aliases or proxies stand in for the asset to be protected, e.g., email aliases, or aliased credit cards.
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(21/N) Our third asset classification option:
None Of Your Business (NOYB)
Assets that by default aren’t shared, but can be accessed, controlled, or managed by others, with your permission. You grant such permissions mostly for practical reasons, to agents bound by formal agreements (like service or maintenance staff), and usually not reluctantly, like with assets classified as "Intimate".
Preferably, NOYB assets are still kept publicly undetectable and unknown. The #ZeroTrust principle can be fully applied here, often using available access control mechanisms, and automation.
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(20/N) Our second asset classification option:
Intimate
Assets that unfortunately can’t stay FYEO, because under certain circumstances, they need to be accessible to, or controlled by, fully trusted persons or entities. Preferably, these assets are kept publicly undetectable and unknown.
Handling of such assets by others requires a considerable amount of #carefulness, #diligence, and #loyalty that exceeds anything that could be pinned down with enough precision in formal documents. Typically, only significant others, some family members, trustees or close friends are entrusted with handling this class of assets.
For most individuals, this class is most likely the best default. Once you have sorted out which assets are actually not Intimate, but FYEO, consider moving them to a separate spreadsheet that is, in itself, classified as FYEO.
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(19/N) Let's now turn to the third question of the #ThreatModelingManifesto:
3. What are you going to do about it?
It pays to first establish a few contraints for what you can do, in theory, by #classifying your #assets. Again, for an individual human being, opposed to organizations or companies, it's nearly impossible to impose principles like #ZeroTrust or Need-to-know on personal relationships, the closer they get.
So, avoid recycling terms from popular, but less intuitive schemes: Fanciful intelligence labels like “top secret”, “confidential”, or “unclassified” do not tell you what goes into the respective box, and how to handle access to it.
Add another column to your assets spreadsheet, label it "Classification", and pick a more human-centered approach for its values, like:
Let's briefly go through these suggestions:
For Your Eyes Only (FYEO)
Assets that are only accessible to, and controlled by nobody but you, because they need to be resilient, even in the face of the closest of your close people misbehaving. Preferably, these assets are kept publicly undetectable and unknown. When you are gone, these assets will be gone, too. FYEO does not make a good default class, though.
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(18/N) Revisit your spreadsheet of assets now, specifically the "Consequences" column we had added in (7/N).
How does your assessment of potential consequences change? Walk through your list of assets, and change the values in the "Consequences" column where needed.
Categories of adversaries: You, and people like you
Criminals
Ideologues
Intruders
Business(i)es
“They”
Threat types: Linking
Identifiying
Undesirable non-repudiation or repudiation
Detecting
Data disclosure
Manufacturing cooperation
Non-compliance
Obstructing
Interfering
Consequences when threats by adversaries become reality (feel free to change and rename): So what?
Hmmm…
Ouch.
Hurts badly.
Life-changing disaster.
Consequences (7/N):
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113548439494399874
Categories of adversaries (8/N):
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113560309025649046
Types of threats (14/N):
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113622961370958693
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(17/N) Finally, two threat types that refer to security more than privacy:
An adversary destroys, withdraws, steals or misappropriates information, access, or resources. The obstruction can be temporary or permanent, partial or total. Obstructing can also occur unintentionally, with the “adversary” being deterioration, malfunction, or disaster.
An adversary deliberately corrupts the integrity or authenticity of information, resources, processes, or interactions. The respective information, resources, processes, or interactions aren’t necessarily controlled or owned by the persons that are affected, and may also be fabricated. Interfering can also occur unintentionally, with the “adversary” being deterioration, malfunction, or disaster.
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(16/N) Three more threat types defined:
Data #disclosure
An adversary makes somebody’s confidential data available to unauthorized parties.
Manufacturing cooperation
An adversary hides from somebody the potentially harmful consequences of their own decisions and actions, or denies them the option of avoiding such consequences, even when they are aware of them.
Contrary to what somebody expects and trusts in, an adversary does not follow laws, documented policies or contractual obligations; or does not abide by what is perceived as conventions, or unwritten rules, in the respective context.
(to be continued)
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865
(15/N) Two more threat types defined:
Undesirable non-repudiation or repudiation
#Repudiation (plausible denial) of what somebody has said / done / known / possessed becomes impossible because an adversary has managed to collect enough evidence to establish undesirable non-repudiation. In other words: the adversary can prove beyond reasonable doubt that "it" happened.
Alternatively, #NonRepudiation (proof beyond reasonable doubt) cannot be established because an adversary has managed to suppress or destroy enough evidence to gain the option of repudiation (plausible denial). In other words: the adversary can plausibly deny "it" happened.
Detecting
An adversary can check for the presence or absence of specific data items, which are tell-tale indicators for something else.
(to be continued)
Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865