Meet Rayhunter:
A New Open Source Tool from EFF to Detect Cellular Spying
At EFF we spend a lot of time thinking about Street Level Surveillance technologies
—the technologies used by police and other authorities to spy on you while you are going about your everyday life
—such as automated license plate readers,
facial recognition,
surveillance camera networks,
and cell-site simulators (. #CSS ).
Rayhunter is a new open source tool we’ve created that runs off an affordable mobile hotspot that we hope empowers everyone,
regardless of technical skill,
to help search out CSS around the world.
CSS
(also known as #Stingrays or #IMSI #catchers)
are devices that masquerade as legitimate cell-phone towers,
tricking phones within a certain radius into connecting to the device rather than a tower.
CSS operate by conducting a general search of all cell phones within the device’s radius.
Law enforcement use CSS to pinpoint the location of phones
often with greater accuracy than other techniques such as cell site location information (CSLI)
and without needing to involve the phone company at all.
CSS can also log International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (IMSI numbers) unique to each SIM card,
or hardware serial numbers (IMEIs) of all of the mobile devices within a given area.
Some CSS may have advanced features allowing law enforcement to intercept communications in some circumstances.
What makes CSS especially interesting, as compared to other street level surveillance, is that
so little is known about how commercial CSS work.
We don’t fully know what capabilities they have
or what exploits in the phone network they take advantage of to ensnare and spy on our phones, though we have some ideas.
We also know very little about how cell-site simulators are deployed in the US and around the world.
There is no strong evidence either way about whether CSS are commonly being used in the US to spy on First Amendment protected activities
such as protests, communication between journalists and sources, or religious gatherings.
There is some evidence
—much of it circumstantial
—that CSS have been used in the US to spy on protests.
There is also evidence that CSS are used somewhat extensively by US law enforcement,
spyware operators, and scammers.
We know even less about how CSS are being used in other countries,
though it's a safe bet that in other countries CSS are also used by law enforcement.
Much of these gaps in our knowledge are due to a lack of solid, empirical evidence about the function and usage of these devices.
Police departments are resistant to releasing logs of their use,
even when they are kept.
The companies that manufacture CSS are unwilling to divulge details of how they work.
Until now, to detect the presence of CSS, researchers and users have had to either rely on Android apps on rooted phones,
or sophisticated and expensive software-defined radio rigs.
Previous solutions have also focused on attacks on the legacy 2G cellular network, which is almost entirely shut down in the U.S.
Seeking to learn from and improve on previous techniques for CSS detection we have developed a better, cheaper alternative that works natively on the modern 4G network.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/meet-rayhunter-new-open-source-tool-eff-detect-cellular-spying
#surveillance #IMSI #Cellphones
"CSS (also known as Stingrays or IMSI catchers) are devices that masquerade as legitimate cell-phone towers, tricking phones within a certain radius into connecting to the device rather than a tower.
"EFF's 'Rayhunter' works by intercepting, storing, and analyzing the control traffic (but not user traffic, such as web requests) between the mobile hotspot Rayhunter runs on and the cell tower to which it’s connected.
"Rayhunter works on a readily-available U$20 device.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/meet-rayhunter-new-open-source-tool-eff-detect-cellular-spying
1) #CloudAct is just #CyberFacism, look it up!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CLOUD_Act
-
2) @signalapp 's #Server code is proprietary and since it's centralized we can't trust that the code they release is what's running on their backend!
-
3) #Signal still demands #PhoneNumbers which are #PII either by association (#Number => #ICCID = #SIM = #IMSI => #IMEI => Location Data as I explained beforetwice) or mandatory #KYC / #ID requirements (even on prepaid cards), which an increasing amount of juristictions do...
-
But don't take my word for it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJoO2uWrX1M
Hier noch ein sehr sinnvoller Tipp: Es laufen gerade bei Demonstrationen sogenannte #IMSI-CATCHER → https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMSI-catcher
Um wirkliche Sicherheit zu haben, sollte man das Gerät ausschalten und zusätzlich wie ein Butterbrot in Alufolie einpacken.
Danach hält das Ding auch wirklich den Mund, kann auch nicht mehr geortet werden ...
Besten Gruß
@halva @lynn @signalapp @deilann
The problem is one needs to literally acquire a phone number and have access to it, and the demand of a phone number itself is bad. This makes it unnecessarily complex and expensive compared to using @monocles / #monoclesChat.
(Cuz if I've to pay to communicate, I might just choose a provider that isn't a #VC #MoneyBurningParty but a long-term sustainable solution based off #OpenStandards!)
Still, #Signal doesn't allow #SelfCustody of all the keys & #SelfHosting, which makes it vulnerable as a #proprietary #centralized, #SingleVendor & #SingleProvider solution.
And with #CloudAct on one hand and #Trump wanting to "Speedrun Hitler", I'd not rely on Signal.
I have setup comms for critical operations (incl. helping people flee Russia!) and I'd rather choose #OnionShare over #Signal if #Metadata is a real concern.
Backyard #Privacy in the Age of #Drones
In addition to high-resolution photographic and video cameras, police drones may be equipped with myriad #spying payloads, such as live-video transmitters, thermal imaging, heat sensors, mapping technology, automated license plate readers, cell site simulators, cell phone signal interceptors and other technologies.
#alpr #imsi #stingray
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/08/backyard-privacy-age-drones
#eBay Removes Listing for #StingRay #Cellphone #Spying Tech
StingRay listed at $100,000 before being removed for violating the platform’s policy on not #surveillance equipment. Listed as “Harris Stingray Cellular Phone Surveillance w/ Power Cord & Rolling Case - USED.
This StingRay may not be able to spy on modern phones. StingRays, and more broadly #IMSI-catchers, of which StingRay is a specific model, have been used by #lawenforcement in #US to track cell phones.
https://www.404media.co/ebay-removes-listing-for-stingray-cellphone-spying-tech/
The Next Generation of #Cell-Site Simulators (CSS) is Here. Here’s What We Know.
CSS, also known as #IMSI catchers, are among #lawenforcement’s most closely-guarded secret #surveillance tools. They act like real #cellphone towers, “tricking” mobile devices into connecting to them, designed to intercept the information that #phones send and receive, like the location of the user and metadata for #phone calls, text messages, and other app traffic.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/next-generation-cell-site-simulators-here-heres-what-we-know #privacy #EFF
Cell Site Simulators ( #CSS ), also known as #IMSI catchers,
are among law enforcement’s most closely-guarded secret surveillance tools.
They act like real cell phone towers, “tricking” mobile devices into connecting to them,
designed to intercept the information that phones send and receive,
like the location of the user and metadata for phone calls, text messages, and other app traffic.
CSS are highly invasive and are used covertly.
In the past, law enforcement used a technique called
“parallel construction”
—collecting evidence in a different way to reach an existing conclusion in order to avoid disclosing how law enforcement originally collected it
—. to circumvent public disclosure of location findings made through CSS.
This technology is like a dragging fishing net, rather than a focused single hook in the water.
Every phone in the vicinity connects with the device; even people completely unrelated to an investigation get wrapped up in the surveillance.
CSS, like other surveillance technologies, subjects civilians to widespread data collection,
even those who have not been involved with a crime,
and has been used against protestors and other protected groups, undermining their civil liberties.
️Their adoption should require public disclosure,
️but this rarely occurs.
In Massachusetts, agencies are expected to get a #warrant before conducting any cell-based location tracking.
The City of Boston is known to own a CSS.
Dozens of policing agencies are currently using cell-site simulators (CSS) by #Jacobs #Technology and its Engineering Integration Group (EIG), according to newly-available documents on how that company provides CSS capabilities to local law enforcement.
A proposal document from Jacobs Technology,
provided to the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) and first spotted by the Boston Institute for Nonprofit Journalism (BINJ),
outlines elements of the company’s CSS services, which include discreet integration of the CSS system into a Chevrolet Silverado and lifetime technical support .
The proposal document from Jacobs provides some of the most comprehensive information about modern CSS that the public has had access to in years.
It confirms that law enforcement has access to CSScapable of operating on 5G
as well as older cellular standards.
It also gives us our first look at modern CSS hardware.
The Jacobs system runs on at least nine software-defined radios that simulate cellular network protocols on multiple frequencies
and can also gather #wifi intelligence.
As these documents describe, these CSS are meant to be concealed within a common vehicle.
Antennas are hidden under a false roof so nothing can be seen outside the vehicles,
which is a shift from the more visible antennas and cargo van-sized deployments we’ve seen before.
The system also comes with a TRACHEA2+ and JUGULAR2+ for direction finding and
mobile direction finding.
Important to the MSP contract is the modification of a Chevrolet Silverado with the CSS system.
This includes both the surreptitious installment of the CSS hardware into the truck and the integration of its software user interface into the navigational system of the vehicle.
According to Jacobs, this is the kind of installation with which they have a lot of experience.
Jacobs has built its CSS project on military and intelligence community relationships,
which are now informing development of a tool used in domestic communities,
not foreign warzones.
#Harris #Corporation, later #L3Harris #Technologies, Inc.,
was the largest provider of CSS technology to domestic law enforcement
but stopped selling to non-federal agencies in 2020.
Once Harris stopped selling to local law enforcement the market was open to several competitors,
one of the largest of which was #KeyW #Corporation.
Following Jacobs’s 2019 acquisition of The KeyW Corporation
and its Engineering Integration Group (EIG),
Jacobs is now a leading provider of CSS to police,
and it claims to have more than 300 current CSS deployments globally.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/next-generation-cell-site-simulators-here-heres-what-we-know
The Next Generation of Cell-Site Simulators is Here. Here’s What We Know.
CSS, also known as #IMSI catchers, are among law enforcement’s most closely-guarded secret #surveillance tools. They act like real cell phone towers, “tricking” mobile devices into connecting to them
#privacy #celltower #cellphone #cellsitesimulator
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/next-generation-cell-site-simulators-here-heres-what-we-know
Ein israelischer Unternehmer verkauft über seine Schweizer Firma Polus #IMSI-#Catcher nach Indonesien – angeblich für den Katastrophenschutz. Doch Recherchen lassen an dieser Darstellung zweifeln.
https://www.woz.ch/2418/ueberwachungstechnologie/wie-gefaehrlich-ist-die-box-aus-zug/!XAPPNJSWFZSN
#iOS 17 and #macOS 14 #LockdownMode improvements
#Wireless connectivity - Your device won't automatically join non-secure #WiFi networks (#WPA etc) and will disconnect from a non-secure Wi-Fi network when you turn on Lockdown Mode. 2G #cellular support is turned off.
2G being disabled by default is an evolution of #LDM -- attempting to better protect from other classes of physical attacks, like #IMSI catchers or fraudulent cell towers performing #MitM attacks
omg! Ivan Krstić heard my call! well, part of it... 2G is now disabled by default on #iOS17 with #LockdownMode!
now to disable 3G and require strong encryption types for 4G and 5G to further harden against #IMSI catchers
City-Wide IMSI-Catcher Detection - #SeaGlass 2017
SeaGlass is a system designed by #security #researchers at the University of #Washington to measure IMSI-catcher use across a city.
#imsi #privacy #surveillance #uow
Salut,
Fin juin et début juillet au pic des révoltes dans la rue et les quartiers j’étais à Toulouse à proximité des quartiers enflammés . Bagatelle, Mirail.
Hélicos, BAC, CRS, et tutti quanti.
Du 1er au 3 juillet mon smartphone (FP4 And.12) s’est mis à rebooter tout seul une bonne vingtaine de fois, plutôt en journée.
L’appareil n’était pas particulièrement en sur-chauffe.
D’après-vous peut-il s’agir d’une attaque provenant d’un #imsi #imsicatcher ?
CC : @commownfr
Docs Show #FBI Pressures Cops to Keep Phone #Surveillance Secrets.
Newly released documents highlight the bureau's continued secrecy around cell-site simulators—spying tech that everyone already assumes exists.
#privacy #imsi #imsicatcher #stingrays #cellsitesimulators #spying
https://www.wired.com/story/fbi-cell-site-simulator-stingray-secrecy/
South African police have sought authorisation for #IMSI-Catchers since at least 2010.
They finally got it.
In the time since – when there was this regulatory hurdle in place – we're pretty sure they've already used them to spy on journalists and politicians.
Article is paywalled: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/after-13-years-of-trying-saps-can-now-legally-use-mass-surveillance-cellphone-grabbers-20230523
But the regulations are here:
https://www.gov.za/documents/communications-and-provision-communication-related-information-act-certificate-exemption
Viele Android-Apps nutzen die Standortermittlung, um den genauen oder ungefähren Standort des Benutzers zu bestimmen. Was jedoch den meisten nicht bewusst ist: Jedes Mal, wenn eine solche Standortermittlung durchgeführt wird, erhält #Google nicht nur den ungefähren Standort, sondern auch die #IMSI-Nummer des Benutzers @kuketz
Weiterlesen: https://www.kuketz-blog.de/android-bei-jeder-standortermittlung-erfaehrt-google-eure-position-inkl-imsi-nummer/
@kuketzblog Nichts gegen die Jungs von #GrapheneOS, aber auch wenn dort die #IMSI entfernt wird, lässt man Graphene doch erstmal wissen, wo man sich aufhält, denn die können ja dann tracken und aufzeichnen, verhindern lediglich im Nachhinein, dass #Google die ID bekommt, oder nicht?