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@erebion @inaruck es gibt soviele Gründe weshalb Mensch nicht @signalapp vertrauen sollte.

Aber um es nochnal klar zu erklären:

Nur echte #Dezentralisierung wie bei #XMPP+#OMEMO kann #Datenschutz, #Informationssicherheit und #Vertraulichkeit sicherstellen.

Die strukturellen Probleme von Signal machen es angesichts einer #gleichgeschaltet|en #USA ein absolut unnötiges #Risiko, denn ich garantiere @Mer__edith wird für keine*n User*in lebenslange #Beugehaft riskieren!

Und #Signal ist sehr wohl in der Lage #Govware - #Backdoors zu integrieren, denn sonst wären die wegen #ITAR bereits geknastet worden, weil diese #Nutzer*innen aus #Kuba, #Nordkorea und #Russland haben!

@lucasmz @Avitus @david_chisnall the benefit of #XMPP+#OMEMO is that there are several providers, including free options...

All #PII incl. #PhoneNumbers can and will be abused by existing governments and if users don't pay, then they are the product and their data is the one to be sold.

After all, you have the same cost problem with phone numbers. Even if one doesn't pay per line/number and never pay for calls and texts, they still have to top it up to extent validity.

  • And again: It's way easier for a government to demand an ID for a #SIM that works in networks around their country (i.e. #Turkey demands registration on a per-#IMEI - basis *with #ID) than to tunnel XMPP+OMEMO through @torproject over #EDGEland-speed #2G networks.

Plus you relying an unfixably insecure #Telephony makes a system inherently unsafer than it needs to be...

  • This is how people get caught!

Also #Signal is able and willing to use said PII to restrict and ban users and if I were some dissident in Cuba or North Korea or even just Eritrea or Yemen I'd not rely on non-enforcement of #OFAC / #USML / #ITAR since Signal can obviously distinguish & identify accounts by virgue if their #PhoneNumber!

  • Always think "How can this be weaponized against someone?" when it comes to #privacy!
GitHublists.d/xmpp.servers.list.tsv at main · greyhat-academy/lists.dList of useful things. Contribute to greyhat-academy/lists.d development by creating an account on GitHub.
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@anelki cuz if #Signal and/or #WhatsApp actually had good encryption, they'd be shutdown due to #NonCompliance with #CloudAct and their staff would be jailed for #ITAR violations...

  • Then again even if WhatsApp technically does #E2EE that doesn't mean it has to be good or secure.

If I use RSA-128 to generate the keys for AES-256 then it's technically E2EE but even the worst-equipped police force can read the comms basically in realtime!

@mysk that's because #Apple has introduced varios #Govware - #Backdoors in their products.

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@cody The fact that #GAFAMs and other #Corporations that commited illegal #Espionage (#PRISM) and/or imtegrated #Govware #Backdoors (i.e. #DUAL_EC_DRBG) ain't #denylisted by @bsi for useage and/or procurement by the German Government and Public Institutions and banned from their premises and networks is undue leniency.

Or would @Bundesregierung literally expect anything but a blanket ban against entire German companies if they were to ship some #ITAR / #Wassenaar / #NPT "compliance check" in their systems when sold to the USA?

Not to mention the #NonCompliance of #Windows, #MicrosoftOffice, #Office365 / #Mcirosoft365, #GoogleDocs, etc. with #GDPR & #BDSG due to #CloudAct...

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@PC_Fluesterer Und wenn nicht wird wie im #Cyberfaschismis dann halt der "#Export" per #ITAR verboten, weil #SSL und #PGP sind pöse sicher... ^

Merke: Wenn's in den #RICS (#Russland, #Indien, "V.R." #China, #SaudiArabien) legal ist und aus den #USA exportiert wurde, dann nur weil's #Malware ist oder anderweitig dienlich ist.

Grundsätzlich haben alle entsprechenden #Govware-Integraten bei mir 3x solange #Hausverbot wie es dauert bis diese sich entschuldingen bzw. 2x solange wie's dauert bis die das Problem systemisch fixen.

Egal of #PRISM, #DUAL_EC_DRBG, oder was auch immer...

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@quincy @thomasjorgensen @lobingera @glynmoody in fact didn't they try countless times to force shit that noone wants onto people, from #Passkeys to removing the #URL to "#WebIntegrityFramework" aka. mandatory #ads that one can't disable...

Let's not forget #Google - like all #GAFAMs - was a #PRISM collaborator, is subject to #CliudAct and #ITAR and thus not only capable but able and willing beyond the legally mandated minimums to do so.

DON'T TRUST GOOGLE - or anyone!

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@rombat @adamhill #Windows not only was never safe, but with #ITAR, #_NSAKEY, #PRISM and #CloudAct it's obvious that #Microsoft can't be trusted.

If somebody says their #Windows10 or #Windows11 #Weather widget says it snows, I've to instinctly go outside or find an #earthTV or similar #Webcam feed to proove it wrong.

I don't trust #Microsoft further than I can piss straight up in the air lying flat on my back and not get wet!
youtube.com/watch?v=twq3SF8Yf-
(And yes that was a real TV ad's audio 1:1)

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@JamesBaker @signalapp @openrightsgroup

Personally, I think the time for pleas and petitions is over:

What is needed are fully #decentralized, #SelfHosting-capable and #FLOSS'd as well as "#E2EE by default" comms and the full rejection of any #Cyberfacism.

This inevitably must include #ITAR & #WassenaarArrangement as well as designing systems to be hardened against attacks including "#LawfulInterception"...

I really need to work more on the #PocketCrypto:
github.com/KBtechnologies/Pock

GitHubGitHub - KBtechnologies/PocketCrypto: An airgapped encryption/decryption device for off-grid communicationAn airgapped encryption/decryption device for off-grid communication - KBtechnologies/PocketCrypto