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#threatintelligence

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ICYMI: DomainTools Investigations released new research this week!

Skeleton Spider (aka FIN6) is leveraging trusted cloud services like AWS to deliver malware through fake job applications and resume-themed phishing campaigns.

🔍 Learn how this financially motivated group is:

🔹Exploiting cloud infrastructure to evade detection
🔹Using social engineering to lure victims
🔹Building resilient, scalable malware delivery systems

Read the full analysis here: dti.domaintools.com/skeleton-s

DomainTools Investigations | DTI · Eggs in a Cloudy Basket: Skeleton Spider’s Trusted Cloud Malware Delivery - DomainTools Investigations | DTIDiscover how the FIN6 cybercrime group, also known as Skeleton Spider, leverages trusted cloud services like AWS to deliver stealthy malware through fake job applications and resume-themed phishing campaigns. Learn about their tactics, infrastructure, and how to defend against these evolving threats.

Scammers scamming other scammers so they can scam you? We’ve reached peak scam inception!

Sites like ScamAdviser are helpful for checking if a website is shady — but guess what? The scammers lurk there too.

They’re leaving negative reviews against other scam sites (because, of course, there is no honor among thieves), as well as legit sites, pretending to be victims. Why? All so they can drop Telegram or WhatsApp contacts for so-called “crypto recovery services” that supposedly helped them get their stolen money back.

Spoiler Alert: These are just more scams!

They’ll say they’ve recovered your lost crypto - then demand a “release fee” or cut to release it. You’ll pay... and never hear from them again.

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam

MISP 2.4.211 & 2.5.13 Released - A Double Dose of Security, Search, and Stability.

These releases are packed with critical security patches, a major overhaul of the search functionality, and a host of improvements and bug fixes to enhance your threat intelligence experience.

#opensource #threatintelligence #threatintel #cti

🔗 misp-project.org/2025/06/06/mi

MISP Open Source Threat Intelligence Platform & Open Standards For Threat Information Sharing · MISP 2.4.211 & 2.5.13 Released - A Double Dose of Security, Search, and StabilityMISP Threat Intelligence & Sharing

CIRCL - Virtual Summer School (VSS) 2025

From 7 July to 18 July 2025, CIRCL will host a two-week online training event featuring hands-on sessions on various tools developed and maintained by CIRCL, as well as training in digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) techniques.

#opensource #dfir #training #cybersecurity #threatintelligence

@ail_project
@misp
@vulnerability_lookup
@gcve

🔗 circl.lu/pub/vss-2025/

www.circl.luCIRCL » CIRCL - Virtual Summer School (VSS) 2025CIRCL - Virtual Summer School (VSS) 2025

DomainTools Investigations’ (DTI) latest analysis uncovers a technically sophisticated malware campaign that uses fake CAPTCHAs and spoofed document verification pages (like Docusign) to trick users into self-infecting their machines with the NetSupport RAT.

Key tactics include:

🔹 Clipboard poisoning via fake CAPTCHA pages
🔹Multi-stage PowerShell downloaders
🔹Spoofed Gitcodes and Docusign domains
🔹Infrastructure overlap with known threat groups like SocGholish, FIN7 and STORM-0408

Read the full breakdown including security recommendations here: dti.domaintools.com/how-threat

Selling your car? Scammers still have it 'VIN' for you!

We've recently seen a large cluster of domains hosting fake Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) lookup sites — and private car sellers are the target.

While this trick isn’t new, it still catches many off guard — especially first-time sellers. Here’s how it usually plays out:

- You list your car on platforms like AutoTrader, Craigslist, or Facebook Marketplace.
- You're contacted by a keen 'buyer', perhaps asking a few questions to build trust.
- The buyer then asks *you* to get a VIN report — but only from a site *they* provide.

Red flag: Legitimate buyers wanting to know a vehicle's history are to be expected - they may ask for the VIN to do this themselves - but insisting on a specific site is a classic scam move.

Here’s what happens next:

- You enter your VIN on the fake site - it teases you with basic info like make and model.
- To get the 'full report' you’re asked to pay $20–$40.
- At best, you're sent to a legitimate payment provider — but the money goes straight to the scammer.
- At worst, you've just entered your card details into a phishing site.

Got your report? Good luck contacting that buyer, they're 'Audi 5000' — long gone. As for the report, it's usually worthless — no odometer readings, no previous owners, no insurance history - and of no value to you or a legit buyer.

Unsurprisingly, 'VIN' features in their devious domain names, and at the time of writing we identrified a large cluster using it with U.S. states and locations, for example:

- goldstatevin[.]com
- gulfstatevin[.]com
- kansasvin[.]com
- misissippivin[.]com
- utahvincheck[.]com

These have since gone offline, hopefully for good. They're not alone though, the following domains appear to target sellers in Australia and are currently active:

- proregocheck[.]com
- smartcheckvin[.]com
- smartvincheck[.]com
- vincheckzone[.]com

Tip: If a buyer wants a VIN report, let them sort it out — or use a trusted provider of your own. If they refuse? Tell 'em to hit the road!

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam

Martyn Williams (Stimson Center’s Korea Program and 38 North) and Nick Roy (Silent Push) presented an interesting talk at THOTCON 0xD on a misconfigured DPRK server and the data they found. Cool to see everything that goes into getting online in DPRK and the tools used to do so. They posted their THOTCON slide deck at silibank.com/thotcon, which Nick apparently purchased after the domain was allowed to expire by DPRK entities.

Their NK Tech Lab site is a new center for investigation and analysis into how North Korea uses technology to serve and suppress its citizens.

Nktechlab.org
Silibank.com/thotcon

#thotcon#dprk#cti

Eat, Sleep, Scam, Repeat?

Losing your life savings to a crypto scam is devastating — but for many victims, the nightmare doesn’t end there.

While recently investigating a network of fake cryptocurrency exchanges, we uncovered something even more twisted: a cluster of scam websites posing as law firms offering 'crypto recovery' services.

Yep, the very same scammers who stole the funds are now posing as lawyers, pretending to help victims recover what they lost… for a fee, of course.

Preying on victim hope and desperation, these scammers have been known to:

- Contact victims directly using details obtained during the original scam
- Advertise openly on social media
- Lurk in public forums, targeting those seeking help from the community

Using a mix of lookalike sites impersonating legit legal firms and entirely fake entities, often with stolen names and photos of legitimate legal professionals, here are some recent examples of what we've encountered:

- Posing as 'Adam & Shawn Law Group'
- adamshawnllp[.]com
- adamshawnlaw[.]com
- Posing as 'Jefferson Caldwell International Law Firm'
- jeffersoncaldwelllawgroup[.]com
- Posing as 'Schlueter & Associates'
- schlueterlawfirm[.]it[.]com
- Posing as 'Zojz & Associates Legal Group'
- zojz[.]com
- zojz[.]cc

Not only do these domains share registration characteristics with fake crypto exchanges, but we've also observed site structures, content and design elements across fake law firms, crypto exchanges and task scam sites.

Aside from avoiding the initial scams, be cautious of any 'law firm' that:

- Sends unsolicited emails or DMs offering crypto recovery help
- Has a website with no verifiable legal credentials
- Pressures you to pay fees upfront, especially to a third-party entity or via crypto
- Uses vague or generic testimonials

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam

AIL 6.2 released - Smarter Analysis, Search and Enhanced User Experience

We’re excited to release AIL Framework v6.2, a major update with new features and improved performance. This version makes analysis easier and the overall experience faster and more user-friendly.

Among the highlights are a fully revamped search engine powered by MeiliSearch, improved language detection for short text, local AI-driven image descriptions, and a yara-hunting editor tool.

🔗 ail-project.org/blog/2025/05/2

Last week, Microsoft reported that their Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) and international partners disrupted Lumma Stealer by taking down 2,300 domains critical to the malware's operation. Shortly after, Palo Alto's Unit 42 reported about cyber campaigns that previously dropped Lumma Stealer are now distributing StealC infostealer payloads. We analyzed the DNS infrastructure related to the attacks and discovered a large number of malicious registered domain generation algorithm (RDGA) domains. Based on passive DNS, the threat actor that controls the infrastructure configured the domains to a staging environment via a dedicated Panama IP address (self-signed SSL) before deploying them. We identified 144 unique domains in this IP space, and all of them were detected as "suspicious" by our algorithms 1-2 months before they were activated for malicious activity.

Disrupting criminal operations is difficult and they will find ways to resurface. However, this example proves that blocking connections at the DNS level can often protect users against the new versions before they emerge. The infostealer actors made a quick turn, but we were already blocking their path. Our specialty is in DNS analytics, so we use DNS signatures, as opposed to malware signatures, for preemptive security. We love this stuff.

Here are some examples of the RDGA domains:
2323dot2[.]cfd, 2323dot2[.]cyou, 2323dot2[.]my, 232pip1[.]my, 232pip1[.]sbs, 832pip[.]cfd, 832pip[.]cyou, 832pip[.]my, 832pip[.]sbs, b3cloud[.]cfd, b3cloud[.]cyou, b3cloud[.]my, b3cloud[.]sbs, bin48[.]cfd, bin48[.]cyou, bin48[.]my, bin898293[.]cfd, bin898293[.]cyou, bin898293[.]my, bin898293[.]sbs, bit7dl[.]cfd, bit7dl[.]cyou, bit7dl[.]my, bit7dl[.]sbs, bot113cloud[.]cfd, bot113cloud[.]cyou, bot113cloud[.]my

These campaigns share similar TTPs with those that we reported several months ago. The threat actor that we discussed in this post (infosec.exchange/@InfobloxThre) also distributed Lumma Stealer and used RDGA domains, but incorporated additional components, such as traffic distribution systems (TDS), web trackers, and cloakers.


#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #infostealer #lummastealer #stealc #tds #tracker #cloaker #rdga

Infosec ExchangeInfoblox Threat Intel (@InfobloxThreatIntel@infosec.exchange)Attached: 1 image Lumma Stealer is currently one of the most popular malware. Campaigns involving this info stealer have a notable presence in DNS. We’ve been tracking a threat actor that deploys large number of domains to advertise file share links dropping Lumma Stealer. These campaigns are interesting because the actor uses traffic distribution system (TDS), cloaking, and web tracking technology (e.g. Matomo, Bablosoft) to hide and protect the malicious content. Here are recent examples of the TDS and landing page domains. :::TDS + Cloaking::: am4[.]myidmcrack[.]site bjnhuy[.]shop filefetch[.]click mplopop[.]shop oyoclean[.]sbs psldi3z[.]com readyf1[.]click volopi[.]cfd :::Landing Page::: 14redirect[.]cfd downf[.]lol fbfgsnew[.]com icjvueszx[.]com lkjpoisjnil[.]site sikoip[.]cfd zulmie[.]cfd An attack that we investigated today showed a new Lumma Stealer payload and C2 domain that is only a day old. :::Lumma Stealer executable SHA256::: df148680db17e221e6c4e8aed89b4d3623f4a8ad86a3a4d43c64d6b1768c5406 :::Text sites containing Lumma Stealer configuration details::: hXXps://rentry[.]co/feouewe5/raw hXXps://pastebin[.]com/raw/uh1GCpxx :::Newly created Lumma Stealer C2::: hXXps://urbjanjungle[.]tech/api #malware #lummastealer #c2 #tds #tracker #cloaking #dns #mastodon #threatintel #cybercrime #threatintelligence #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel

Our latest blog is out! It covers a rising issue that many major organization experiences: Subdomain hijacking through abandoned cloud resources.

This research follows our reporting from earlier in the year about the CDC subdomain hijack. We initially assumed that this was an isolated incident. Well… We were wrong.

We tied some of this activity to a threat actor, dubbed Hazy Hawk, who hijacks high-profile subdomains which they use to conduct large-scale scams and malware distribution.

blogs.infoblox.com/threat-inte

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #HazyHawk

We implemented a major new feature in the AIL Project that addresses a long-standing issue related to the collection of images or screenshots that may be harmful to analysts (e.g., violent content, CSAM, etc.). The feature allows users to trigger the description of an image before actually viewing it.

The feature will be included in the upcoming release of AIL (version 6.2).

This work is co-funded in the AIPITCH project. We would like to thank Qwen for the open source Qwen2-VL vision-language models which provide an excellent basis for image detection and description while allowing local inferences.

@aipitch @circl @ail_project