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#sandboxing

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New Open-Source Tool Spotlight 🚨🚨🚨

Microsandbox is a self-hosted platform enabling secure execution of untrusted code. Using microVMs, it combines hardware isolation with startup times under 200ms—ideal for testing AI-generated or user-submitted code. Its SDKs offer multi-language support, including Python and Node.js. #sandboxing #security

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@bohwaz @punkfairie @ajsadauskas @JessTheUnstill @tomiahonen That's exactly the problem, cuz #KaiOS nee #FirefoxOS was a good and solid basis not just for #LowEnd-Devices but could've been excellent for a more #secure mobile OS, as it has good potential for #sandboxing and #KISS-principle'd #Apps that are lean and efficient.

But then again when enthusiasts like @fuchsiii and I were shouting "#ShutUpAndTakeMyMoney!" to #Mozilla, they basically refused to sell any #device, and then we get the "#PSvita-Effect":

I've seen #AppArmor used primarily to *harden* the security of an existing program. Is it also reasonable to use it to *sandbox* known-malicious code? Or are other methods required?

(I assume you also want ulimit or similar on the side, but that's to prevent resource consumption attacks rather than sandbox escapes.)

#Syd is a rock-solid application #kernel to sandbox applications on Linux>=5.19. Syd is similar to Bubblewrap, Firejail, GVisor, and minijail. As an application kernel it implements a subset of the Linux kernel interface in user space, intercepting system calls to provide strong isolation without the overhead of full virtualization. Syd is secure by default, and intends to provide a simple interface over various intricate #Linux #sandboxing mechanisms such as LandLock, Namespaces, Ptrace, and Seccomp-{BPF,Notify} gitlab.exherbo.org/sydbox/sydb

GitLabSydbox / sydbox · GitLabrock-solid application kernel
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@kde@floss.social @kde@lemmy.kde.social

Can you tell us what happens on the "sandbox all the things" goal?

I think this is a pretty crucial step forward, even though #sandbox technologies (most often through user namespaces) are more problematic than I initially thought.

(Basically, user #namespaces open up #privesc dangers to the monolithic #kernel, which is incredible. #Android and #ChromeOS use #LXC, mounts and #SELinux for #sandboxing)

Auditing, supply chain security, and sandboxing are related.

For the code running outside of the sandbox, you do a direct code audit of your own code and vendored code, as well as a supply chain audit of the dependencies.

For the code running inside the sandbox, you assess what auditing is necessary (typically less than the auditing outside of the sandbox) and do that as well.

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#ChristineBejerasco talking about "Secure-by-Design: How do You Design with a Security Mindset for the User?" at #SCS23:

- Design for ease of use
- Design with misuse in mind
- How we failed to prevent online access/commerce, word processors, email, supply chains, IoT devices, … being misused

Design approaches:
- Password meters, outdated/weak software/plugins, keygrabbing preventions, password managers → #SSO, app #sandboxing, #FullDiskEncryption #FDE, …